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Abstract 
Chinese aid, finance, trade and investment 
flows to Africa are growing fast. We consider 
the consequences of these trends using a 
quantified framework. Very often, adequate 
data are simply non-available, but we find 
that existing data provide useful insights on 
what is ongoing. We first discuss the 
allocation of Chinese aid, using data on 
turnover of economic cooperation, and we 
find it is at least partially comparable to other 
bilateral aid. We also consider the potential 
issue created by re-indebtedness of African 
countries borrowing to China. Second, we 
show, through studying African import 
patterns, that the growing importation of 
Chinese products in Africa can be 
interpreted as trade creation instead of trade 
diversion. Hence it has positive rather than 
negative impact on African economies. 
Third, we study the influence of Chinese 
engagement on economic diversification. We 
show that the usual “Dutch disease” 
argument is debatable. We find that none of 
the various dimensions of China 
engagement has had so far a significant 
impact, positive or negative, on African 
economic diversification. For the future, the 
evolving preferential trade regime offered by 
China, and its policy of creating special 
economic zones, could help tip the balance 
on the positive side. 
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1. Introduction 
Engagement with China is an important phenomenon for the African continent. Beyond the 
quantitative impact of growing aid, finance, trade and investment flows, this engagement may 
have significant qualitative impacts on African development, positive and negative. It is often 
alleged that the heavy role played by extractive industries in Africa’s engagement with China 
will impede diversification. More generally it is stated that China’s engagement in Africa could 
undermine African development, implying an adverse impact on aid effectiveness. However, too 
often such discussions are based on informed opinion, rather than on hard data and research 
results. This paper approaches these debates using as much as possible a quantified framework, 
in an attempt to go beyond the common wisdom. The issues addressed include aid effectiveness, 
trade creation, and diversification.  
Chinese assistance (defined by the turnover of economic cooperation) has traditionally focused 
on countries with which it has good political relations and countries with oil and mineral 
resources. However, recent trends have seen some broadening of Chinese assistance. Chinese 
assistance has traditionally provided support for poverty reduction, has focused on sectors that 
have been relatively untouched by Africa’s traditional development partners, and does not appear 
to have impaired debt sustainability. Thus Chinese assistance has overall played a positive role in 
supporting African development. 
UN Comtrade data reveal that China’s involvement in Africa has contributed to a sharp increase 
in Africa’s trade and welfare, in part related to China’s financial assistance. And so far, China’s 
engagement with Africa has not affected African economic diversification, although China’s 
support for special economic zones and tariff preferences may help increase African 
diversification. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of China’s 
past engagement in Africa, based on the existing literature and on data describing stylised facts 
on China-Africa trade, FDI and aid flows. The third section considers the debate over the 
effectiveness of China’s development assistance. The fourth section examines trade, FDI and 
diversification in detail. And the final section considers the way forward in the context of the 
global financial crisis. 
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2. Background information 
2.1. Literature review on China engagement in Africa  
As background to the research in this paper, the following is a non-exhaustive review of the 
recent literature on China’s engagement in Africa through aid, finance, trade flows, trade policy, 
and FDI.   
A few authors (Wang 2007, Brautigam 2008, and Kragelund 2008) have developed estimates of 
aid flows to Africa, which remain relatively small compared to aid flows from DAC members. 
Foster and others (2009), using a new database based on information released by the press, 
estimate that Chinese infrastructure finance commitments to sub-Saharan Africa totalled $16 
billion from 2001-07.  While some of this finance has an element of concessionality, most of it 
does not meet the DAC definition for aid. 
Several studies, many critical of Chinese policy, focus on the nature and “quality” of Chinese aid 
to Africa.  For example, McCormick (2008) and Penhelt (2007) are concerned that China does 
not take into account the quality of governance in recipients when allocating aid.  Thus according 
to Penhelt, China is willing to provide aid to “unstable and problematic regions and rogue States” 
that DAC members are more reluctant to support. Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris (2006) also 
point to several examples of China’s significant involvement in fragile states.  However, none of 
these papers provide statistical evidence to support the claim that China provides aid regardless 
of the quality of governance.   
Some studies point to positive aspects of Chinese aid.  While Davis et al. (2008) acknowledge 
the debatable role that China has played in resource-rich countries like Angola and the Sudan, 
they find that “China’s approach has been one of mutual respect, also awarding small African 
countries with relatively little economic and political significance, with aid and investment 
support.” Wang (2007) and Foster and others (2009) point out that China provides substantial 
funds for infrastructure, for example in power (mainly hydropower), transport (mainly railroads), 
and information and communications technology (mainly equipment supply), where traditional 
donors allocate relatively little assistance.   
It does not appear that China’s engagement in Africa has substantially impaired efforts to ease 
Africa’s debt burden. Reisen (2008) concludes that Chinese lending has not endangered the   8
positive outcome of the HIPC initiative, and several papers points to the significant amounts of 
debt relief granted or promised by China (e.g., Wang, 2007, and Penhelt, 2007). 
The determinants and impact of China’s trade with Africa are discussed extensively in the 
literature. It is often considered that China’s engagement in Africa is driven primarily by its 
strategic search for raw materials (e.g., Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2006; Asche and 
Schüller, 2008).   
China’s trade with Africa has been supported by trade liberalization in both Africa and China, 
including Chinese tariff exemptions on a number of products exported by eligible African 
countries (Zafar 2007). However, both Zafar (2007) and Broadman (2007) point to the 
persistence of tariff escalation and tariff peaks that may limit increases in the value added 
content of Africa’s exports to China.  Minson (2008) concludes that, while the benefits for Africa 
of China’s preferential trade policy are likely to be modest, the preferences have been 
thoughtfully tailored to African export capacities. China’s trade and investment in Africa also 
has been supported by implicit subsidies provided by Government support programmes with low 
cost loans (Asche and Schüller 2008), while Kernen (2007) emphasizes the importance of 
multiple private sector networks and the increasingly significant role of Chinese privatized 
companies and the Chinese diaspora.
2 
Broadman (2007) is one of the few studies based on microeconomic data, using a survey of both 
Chinese and non-Chinese firms in South Africa, Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania. He finds that 
China’s trade with and investment in Africa tend to reinforce each other, and notes significant 
investments in non-primary industries such as clothing, food industry, transport, building, 
tourism, power plants, and telecommunications. He finds that Chinese investment in Africa has 
had a limited role (largely in apparel) in integrating African countries in the global 
decomposition of the value chain, and that Chinese enterprises have played a positive role 
through transferring technology and are more active than other enterprises in regional trade. Thus 
trade with China could contribute to the product and geographic diversification of African 
exports. 
Henley et al. (2008) survey firms involved in FDI outside of the extractive sector.  Chinese firms 
within this sample are overwhelmingly concentrated in the manufacturing sector (particularly in 
                                                 
2 On the role of the Chinese diaspora, see also the February 2008 issue of the China Monitor published by the Centre 
for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch.    9
the textile and apparel industry) and (consistent with Broadman 2007) many have set up export 
platforms in East Africa to take advantage of the trade preferential regimes granted by the US 
and EU to African countries.  
Chen et al (2007) survey Chinese firms involved in the African construction sector, and find that 
the success of Chinese firms was due both to cost competitiveness, derived from access to cheap 
capital, low-cost labour, and cheap building materials, and to political support from the Chinese 
government. However, the political support enjoyed by Chinese construction firms does not 
exempt them from the challenges faced by other construction firms in terms of economic and 
political instability, poor quality of local inputs and weak infrastructure. 
2.2. Recent Trends in Trade between China and Africa 
While the analysis of African trade data confronts significant issues (box 1), it is clear that 
Africa’s trade with China has increased sharply since the late 1990s (figure 1). African exports to 
China increased from close to zero in 1998 to about $50 billion in 2008, while China’s exports to 
Africa have risen 15-fold.  China accounted for only 0.9% of African exports and 3% of African 
imports in 1998, rising to 11.1% of exports and 9.1% of imports in 2008. The CIF/FOB trade 
balance of African countries vis-à-vis China shows an average deficit of $ 1.3 billion from 1998 
to 2007, but exhibited a surplus of US$ 1.9 billion in 2008, thanks to the oil and mineral price 
boom.    
Box 1: Data on African trade with China 
We have at our disposal different sources of data on Africa’s trade with China: Chinese 
official data provided by MOFCOM, and data from international organizations, including  
UN COMTRADE data and IMF DOT. We prefer using international sources, so as to include 
data on Africa’s trade with countries other than China. UN COMTRADE data have the merit 
of being a primary source, being based on statistics reported by the governments to the UN 
system, and of including details on the commodity composition of trade that are necessary 
for  our analysis. Since not all African countries report to this system, regional aggregations 
are generally based on “mirror” data, i.e. estimates of African trade based on data reported by 
African partner countries.  However, the partner data report African imports in FOB terms 
and African exports in CIF terms, so that estimates of the trade balance are not accurate.  
Also, UN COMTRADE data are available only until 2006 or 2007, depending on the 
country. IMF DOT is a secondary source, and provides only aggregates, but it provides data 
up until 2008. Hence we will use IMF DOT data when recent data will be needed and UN 
COMTRADE data otherwise. IMF DOT data have also the merit of providing directly a 
correct assessment of the CIF/FOB trade balance. We have checked that the overall trends of 
China-Africa trade in the two sources are consistent.   10
Figure 1: China-Africa trade flows 
 
Source: IMF DOT 
 
The rise in African exports is heavily concentrated in a few oil-exporting countries, although 
other countries that are dependent on the China market provide minerals (copper, cobalt, coltan) 
or beginning with 2003, agricultural raw materials (cotton, sesame).  By contrast, a diverse set of 
countries import substantial amounts from China, including relatively rich countries (e.g. 
Botswana, Namibia) and relatively poor ones (e.g. Eritrea, Niger).  Only six countries (Benin, 
DR Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Sudan and Tanzania) that have large imports from China also 
have significant exports. As we will see below, the rise in imports from China is not closely 
correlated with exports and cannot easily be explained by a gravity model, but appears to be 
related to other aspects of Africa’s engagement with China, notably investment and financial 
flows.    
2.3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Chinese investment in Africa has increased rapidly since 1996, stimulated by incentives from the 
Chinese government and by the economic recovery of African countries. By 2005, China had 
already established more than 800 enterprises in Africa, covering 49 countries. Nevertheless, the 
stock of China’s FDI to Africa amounted to only 1.1% of total FDI to Africa in 2007, up from 
0.2% in 2003. Still, this estimate (based on MOFCOM data) omits many Chinese foreign 
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Virgin Islands. And China’s FDI to Africa is growing much more rapidly than FDI from other 
countries (figure 2).
3  
Figure 2: China and non-China FDI stocks in Africa 
 
Source: based on MOFCOM and UNCTAD data 
The destination of Chinese and non-Chinese investments in Africa have become more similar 
over time: the correlation between the country distribution of Chinese and non-Chinese FDI in 
Africa rose from 0.25 in 2003 (not statistically significant at the 5% level) to 0.71 in 2007 (and 
highly significant). Nevertheless, striking differences remain. For example, Algeria, Sudan, 
Zambia, Mauritius and Niger account for 37% of Chinese FDI to Africa, but only 8% of non-
Chinese FDI to Africa.  
2.4. Development assistance and financial flows 
It is difficult to give a clear picture of China’s development assistance to African countries. Such 
assistance is administered by no less than 23 line ministries and agencies (Kragelund, 2008). It is 
almost impossible to disentangle what would be development assistance in the OECD/DAC 
definition and what would be merely financial flows. Chinese development assistance can take 
different forms: grants extended for social projects (health, education, housing) in the form of 
material assistance, technical assistance and personnel training; interest-free loans given notably 
for infrastructure projects; concessional loans provided by China EXIM Bank; and debt relief.  
                                                 
3 These data are based on definitions comparable to UNCTAD definition and can therefore be compared to total FDI 
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Kragelund (2008) finds that Chinese aid flows to Africa in 2005 substantially exceeded the $731 
million reported by official sources, and may have reached $8.1 billion. Wang (2007) estimates 
that  China’s ODA to sub-Saharan Africa averaged between $1.0 billion and $1.5 billion per year 
in 2004-2005. Brautigam (2008), using the Chinese definition (which excludes the face value of 
concessional loans from the external assistance budget), finds that China’s external assistance to 
Africa was about $525 million in 2007 and close to $1 billion in 2009.   
By all of these estimates Chinese aid to Africa is growing rapidly, but remains small compared to 
assistance from OECD/DAC members. In January 2009, Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen 
Deming announced that in 2009 China would meet its commitment to double aid made at the 
2006 Beijing Summit of the China-African Cooperation Forum, and that “168 debts” due by 33 
African countries by the end of 2005 will have been cancelled.
4 In addition, China EXIM Bank’s 
Vice President Li Jun stated at the 2007 African Development Bank Annual Meetings in 
Shanghai that it would provide $20 billion over the next three years in infrastructure and trade 
financing on commercial terms. Following this meeting, the Chinese State Council approved the 
creation of a $5 billion China-Africa Development Fund, to be administered by the China 
Development Bank.
5 
Given the close linkages between Chinese development aid and financing, an indirect estimate of 
the size of China’s aid flows can be based on contracted projects under the turnover of economic 
cooperation data published in the China statistical yearbook.
6 According to this admittedly 
imperfect indicator, China’s financial engagement with Africa was relatively stable at around $2 
billion per year from 1998 to 2002, rising to $12.7 billion in 2007. Foster et al. (2009) finds that 
about 90% of the turnover of economic cooperation flows was related to Chinese (as opposed to 
multilateral) financing from 2002-05, so these data may provide a relatively accurate picture of 
                                                 
4 Source: Xinhua news agency, 20 January 2009. 
5 Source: Lucy Corkin, Christopher Burke and Martyn Davies, China’s Role in the Development of Africa’s 
Infrastructure, SAIS Working Papers in African Studies n°04-08. 
6  We include the estimates of projects under Turnover of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries or 
Regions”, which reflects: (1) overseas civil engineering construction projects financed by foreign investors; (2) 
overseas projects financed by the Chinese government through its foreign aid programs; (3) construction projects of 
Chinese diplomatic missions, trade offices and other institutions stationed abroad; (4) construction projects in China 
financed by foreign investment; (5) sub-contracted projects to be taken by Chinese contractors through a joint 
umbrella project with foreign contractor(s); and (6) housing development projects.  We add also to these labour 
services (activities of providing technology and labour services to employers or contractors in the forms of receiving 
salaries and wages) and design consultation (projects with income for technical services provided to overseas 
operators).  
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China’s financial engagement with Africa. Since China’s assistance is tied to the purchase of 
Chinese goods, data on Africa’s imports from China also may provide information on the size of 
China’s assistance, an issue addressed in the next section.   
3.  Aid and Official Financial Flows from China to Africa and the Aid Effectiveness Debate 
3.1. Geographical allocation of aid and Official Financial Flows  
The country allocation of Chinese aid provides important information on aid effectiveness.  For 
example, is Chinese aid channelled largely to countries with poor governance, high rates of 
poverty, or with close diplomatic ties with China (to the possible detriment of countries that 
could use aid more effectively)?  Here we undertake econometric tests of what has driven the 
country allocation of China’s financial assistance. The dependent variable is the data on turnover 
of economic cooperation (divided by population) described above. The independent variables 
include: (i) governance indicators published by the World Bank; (ii) per capita income; (iii) size, 
defined by population; (iv) alternative specifications of political ties, including the number of 
years with continuous diplomatic relations, a dummy variable for the existence of diplomatic 
relations in each year, and dummy variables for the existence of at least 5 or 10 years of 
diplomatic relations; and (v) in order to control for the existence of opportunities for economic 
cooperation of Chinese companies related to privately funded projects, the stock of inward FDI 
(divided by population) and a dummy variable for oil rich countries.   
We find that our explanatory variables are reasonably good predictors of the turnover of 
economic cooperation only in recent years, but that none of them can explain it in previous years.  
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Table 1: Determinants of turnover of economic cooperation (2004-2007): OLS regression 
   [1]     [2]     [3]     [4]    
GDP per capita  0.07    0.09     -0.02     0.06   
  (0.28)   (0.42)   (0.08)   (0.27)   
population  -0.38 ***-0.37 ***-0.35 ***  -0.33 ***
  (3.01)   (3.25)   (3.03)   (2.72)   
stock of FDI per capita  0.44  ***0.43  ***0.51  *** 0.45  ** 
  (2.61)   (2.72)   (3.08)   (2.65)   
dummy for oil rich country  1.54  **  1.64  **  1.69  **  1.60  ** 
  (2.24)   (2.57)   (2.58)   (2.34)   
number of years diplomatic  ties  0.03  **          
  (2.24)            
dummy for diplomatic ties      2.21  ***       
     (3.50)         
dummy for 5 years diplomatic 
ties        1.59  ***     
        (3.02)      
dummy for 10 years diplomatic 
ties           1.00  ** 
           (2.20)   
intercept  -3.66   -5.34   -3.54   -4.41   
   (1.05)     (1.66)     (1.06)     (1.28)    
R2  0.551     0.606     0.584     0.549    
Number of countries  52     52     52     52    
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level. Student-t statistics within brackets. Method of 
estimation: between countries. All variable in logs except the dummy variables for diplomatic ties and the control of 
corruption qualitative indicator.  
The regression results provide some useful insight into the determinants of Chinese assistance.  
The stock of FDI per capita and the dummy for oil-rich countries are significantly related to the 
turnover of economic cooperation, indicating that Chinese financing is closely related to its 
foreign investment.  All of the indicators of diplomatic ties are significant as well, indicating that 
Chinese aid, like that of the traditional donors (see Alesina and Dollar 2000), is closely related to 
political relationships. And we observe a bias towards small countries, as in analyses of DAC 
donors’ aid. 
Two negative results should be highlighted.  The coefficient on per capita GDP is not significant. 
And while China’s engagement in Africa (unlike that of traditional donors—see e.g. Berthelemy 
2006) is usually described as focused on countries with governance issues, none of the 
governance indicators’ coefficients were significant (result not reported).    15
The non-significant coefficient on per capita GDP may result because the turnover of economic 
cooperation can be financed both by development assistance (in which case it is expected to be 
decreasing with GDP per capita of the partner country) and by profitable investment (in which 
case it is expected to be increasing with GDP per capita). Another test of this relationship is to 
define a dummy variable for countries where the engagement with China (the ratio of economic 
turnover to GDP) was above the median. This dummy variable is the dependent variable in a 
probit model, where the explanatory variables are the same as before, averaged over the 2004-
2007 period. The results of these probit regressions are reported in Table 2. The main difference 
with previous regressions is that this time GDP per capita has the expected negative and 
significant parameter. Attempts at introducing governance indicators failed as previously and are 
not reported. Alternative thresholds at 60% and 40% of the sample generated roughly the same 
results. 
7   
Table 2: Determinants of turnover of economic cooperation (2004-2007): probit regressions 
Dependent variable 
Dummy variable for 
 China engagement 
 among 50% highest 
Dummy variable for 
China engagement 
among 40% highest 
Dummy variable for 
China engagement 
among 60% highest 
   Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
GDP per capita  -0.92  *** -1.20  *** -1.08  ***  -0.60  * 
 (2.78)    (3.29)    (2.91)    (1.79)   
population -0.37  **  -0.41  **  -0.61  ***  -0.47  ** 
 (2.31)    (2.48)    (3.16)    (2.59)   
stock of FDI  0.53  **  0.72  *** 0.58  **  0.61  ** 
 (2.35)    (2.94)    (2.32)    (2.38)   
dummy for oil rich   0.85    1.19    0.68       
country (1.09)    (1.51)    (0.76)       
number of years   0.03  *      0.05  **  0.04  ** 
of diplomatic ties  (1.93)        (2.39)    (2.19)   
Dummy for 5 years 
of diplomatic ties      2.91  **         
     (2.55)           
intercept 15.54  *** 17.91  *** 20.01  ***  15.93  *** 
 (3.13)    (3.42)    (3.48)    (3.04)   
pseudo R2  0.196     0.293     0.305     0.288    
nb of countries  52     52     52     48    
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level.Student-t statistics within brackets. All variable are in 
logs except the dummy variables for diplomatic ties and the control of corruption qualitative indicator.  
                                                 
7 For the 60% threshold, the oil dummy is dropped because it perfectly predict being among the largest beneficiaries 
of China engagement.    16
Another issue which could be subjected to econometric tests is whether Chinese aid is directed at 
the same countries as that of traditional donors, which in the absence of adequate donor 
coordination would increase the administrative burden on recipient governments. In general, 
Chinese development and financial assistance is poorly coordinated with other donors’ 
assistance. There is no coordination with other bilateral donors, although some very preliminary 
discussions have been initiated by China with bilateral donors, towards co-financing of projects 
(e.g. the French AFD). There have been some efforts at coordination with multilateral donors, 
including agreements between China EXIM Bank and both the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank, and an agreement between China’s Development Bank and the African 
Development Bank.
8 It is too early to judge the effectiveness of these agreements, although joint 
financing of infrastructure projects is underway between China EXIM Bank and the two 
multilateral institutions. However, the low level of donor coordination may not have a substantial 
impact on recipient countries, because the geographical distribution of the turnover of economic 
cooperation is not significantly correlated with the geographical distribution of total ODA and 
other financial flows received from DAC and/or multilateral donors (results not reported). Thus 
Chinese assistance does not appear to increase aid fragmentation in recipient countries.    
3.2.  The tying of aid 
Most Chinese development and financial assistance is tied. Development assistance is usually 
granted in kind, while financial assistance is given to finance contracts that are implemented by 
Chinese companies. The only part of Chinese assistance that may be considered as untied is debt 
relief. By contrast, about 90% of OECD/DAC member country assistance is untied, and only 
Korea (which only became DAC member in November 2009), still provides mostly tied 
assistance.  
Tying reduces the effectiveness of aid only if it leads to higher prices of goods financed by aid, 
or less efficient or suitable goods not fully compensated by lower prices. Goods and services 
procured by China are highly competitive compared to the same goods and services that would 
be procured by OECD/DAC member countries. Hence its practice of tying of aid may not create 
                                                 
8 These Memorandums of Understanding focus on (i) Exchange of information regarding each other's respective 
activities in Africa; (ii) Sharing of development knowledge and experience; (iii) Providing co-financing or guarantee 
of public and possibly private sector investment projects; (iv) Exchange or secondment of professional staff; (v) 
Joint regional, country, economic and sector studies; (vi) Aid harmonization, development policy and strategy 
coordination; and (vii) any other areas as may be agreed upon between the parties from time to time.   17
a significant distortion of competition. In addition, Chinese aid tying is comparable to the Korean 
practice, and to common practice in OECD/DAC countries up until 15-20 years ago.  However, 
the tying aid may reduce opportunities for domestic producers (see Brautigam 2008).  
3.3. Official financial flows and debt sustainability  
The availability of loans from China has been viewed as threatening concerted efforts to improve 
debt sustainability in poor African countries. Chinese loans to African countries could represent 
free riding by a new lender who takes advantage of the increased payment capacities of HIPC 
countries resulting from debt relief granted under the HIPC and MDRI (multilateral debt relief 
initiative) from Africa’s traditional donors. Chinese loans also could undermine these efforts to 
restore poor country solvency. However, Reisen (2008) concludes that there is little risk of new 
excess indebtedness in HIPC countries due to borrowing from China. We expand his analysis by 
including all countries that reached the HIPC decision point by 2007, and by including a larger 
number of countries with high engagement with China.
9 The ratio of the net present value of debt 
to exports of goods and services of countries with high China engagement (with a turnover of 
economic cooperation to GDP ratio above the African median from 2004-07) is not significantly 
higher than the ratio for countries with low China engagement (Table 3). In addition, the change 








                                                 
9 Among HIPC countries, Reisen (2008) assumes that Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia may have borrowed 
significant money from China. However the turnover of economic cooperation to GDP ratio of these three countries 
is only just above the median of African countries. Several HIPC or interim HIPC countries have turnover of 
economic cooperation to GDP ratio higher than the median: Central African Republic, Congo, Gambia, Guinea, 
Mali, Mauritania and Sierra Leone.     18







Difference   
   n.  obs.  mean  n. obs.  mean  mean    
NPV of debt/GDP ratio 2004  9  70.7  9  30.7  40.0  *
NPV of debt/GDP ratio 2007  14  47.6  13  15.3  32.4 
*
*
∆(NPV of debt/GDP ratio 2007-
2004) 9  -16.2  9  -21.8  5.5   
NPV of debt/Exports ratio 2004  9  272.5  9  199.7  72.8   
NPV of debt/Exports ratio 2007  13  159.6  13  109.7  50.0   
∆(NPV of debt/Exports ratio 2007-
2004)  9 -83.6  9 -144.7  61.1    
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level.  
Similarly, more recent data (including estimates for 2007) reinforce Reisen’s conclusion that 
resource rich, non-HIPC IDA-only countries with substantial engagement with China (Angola, 
Congo—included in our previous analysis—Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe) have experienced a 
decline in debt ratios in recent years. However, the small number of observations does not allow 
tests of differences with a control group of non-HIPC IDA-only countries with low Chinese 
engagement. Hence this conclusion is not necessarily robust. We conclude that loans from China 
have not impaired debt sustainability in poor African countries, although this may become a 
problem as China becomes more involved with Africa. For example, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo had to modify the terms of its assistance package from China (which involves $9 billion 
in mining and infrastructure projects) to qualify for completion of its US$ 6.3 billion (in NPV 
terms) HIPC debt relief.  
4.  Trade, FDI and diversification 
4.1. Primary commodity exports: the “Dutch disease” argument 
Increased demand for oil and minerals by China and other big emerging countries have boosted 
prices on international markets. The resulting booms in African oil and minerals exporters could   19
divert capital and labour from tradable sectors (the Dutch disease), potentially limiting 
diversification. Investment in the mining sectors of African economies are often financed by FDI 
(box 2 shows the example of Angola), so that it is not obvious that a commodity boom in a poor 
African economy will reduce capital available for investment in manufactures or agriculture.  
And while the commodity boom may also divert skilled labour, much of the skilled labour 
required in mining is sector specific, and is often imported. Goldstein and others (2006) conclude 
that higher raw materials prices do not appear to have greatly impeded diversification in African 
economies. 
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In a relatively short period of time China has become Angola’s second largest trade partner, 
after the United States (40% of Angola’s exports). In 2006, Angola’s exports to China 
represented 35.6% of its total exports, up from 13.6% in 2002. Total bilateral trade increased 
seven fold between 2002 and 2005, from US$ 1 billion to almost US$ 7 billion, and doubled 
to US$14 billion in 2007. This rapid rise in Chinese imports is mostly explained by the sharp 
increase in China’s oil imports from Angola since 2002. In the first trimester of 2008, Angola 
overtook Saudi Arabia for a second time as China’s main oil supplier (the first time was in the 
first trimester of 2006). Timber, fisheries and marble have only a minimal share of Angolan 
exports to China. In 2006 Angola became China’s top trading partner in the African continent 
surpassing South Africa, a status it continues to hold. 
With the sector dominated by the Western oil majors, Luanda has been seeking to diversify its 
partnerships, having launched two licensing rounds recently (2005/2006 and 2007/2008), 
which attracted large and small contenders from all over the world, including companies from 
China, India and Japan. Following the signing of the ExIm Bank credit line in March 2004, 
Sinopec acquired its first stake in an Angolan oil block. The stake in question was 50% of oil 
block 18 that previously belonged to Shell (the other 50% belong to BP) and was initially to 
be sold to an Indian company (Videsh). Allegedly, in face of a bigger offer from the Chinese, 
Sonangol handed over the stake to Sinopec.  In the bid round of 2005/2006, China claimed 
important stakes in the exploration of three important blocks: 40% stake in another part of 
block 18, 20% in block 15 and 27.5% in block 17. At US$2 billion, Chinese bids were 
reported to be the highest ever offered for exploration acreage in the world. In 2006 Sinopec 
established a joint venture with the Angolan national oil company (Sonangol) under the name 
of Sonangol Sinopec International in which it holds a 55% stake. The purpose was to jointly 
operate stakes in offshore oil blocks and to build a US$3 billion refinery at Lobito. Business, 
however, did not go as expected and in March 2007 Sonangol and Sinopec’s negotiations over 
the refinery in Lobito collapsed, supposedly over a disagreement on the technology to be used, 
which would favour the supply of the Chinese market, while Angola mainly wanted to supply 
its own domestic market. In the end, the Angolan government decided to proceed alone with 
the project.  
In the construction sector, Chinese companies have made impressive inroads, especially in the 
last four years. Excluding oil and diamonds, over half of Chinese FDI in Angola is directed to 
the construction sector, followed by light industry, retail and transport. According to Angola’s 
private investment national agency Chinese investment in construction rose at a fast pace in 
recent years but still pales in comparison to traditional investors such as Brazil and Portugal. A 
large number of Chinese companies, mostly parastatals, entered the Angolan market in the 
framework of the first ExIm Bank loan in early 2004. Encouraged by political stability, fast 
economic growth and improved investment and legal frameworks, some have established 
headquarters in Luanda and started venturing outside the areas covered by the Chinese credit 
lines. Among these are: China Road and Bridge Corporation, China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation, China Guangxi International Construction Lda and China Jiangsu.  
Like in the rest of the continent, China seems to be particularly keen on delivering high 
prestige buildings such as the Ministry of Finance, the High Court, various Congress halls, as 
well as edifices for the masses, like hospitals, schools and stadiums. All of these works are 
wrapped up in quick and cheap delivery packages, with the aim of enhancing China visibility 
and political capital within the country and maximising goodwill amongst the Angolan 
government and the general population. Chinese reputation is, however, being threatened by 
the alleged poor quality of their work.  
Source: Chris Alden, SAIIA. 
Box 2: China’s FDI in extractive industries in Angola   21
4.2. Trade Liberalization between China and Africa 
China engagement in Africa has led to major increases in trade flows. Development and financial 
assistance granted by China to African partner countries, which is generally tied, reduces the 
opportunity cost of imports from China. This acts the same way as a subsidy on China exports to 
African countries. The trade effect of this implicit subsidy is equivalent to a partial liberalization 
of imports of Chinese products in African countries, which could lead to trade creation and 
diversion: African countries import more Chinese products (trade creation) and could, as a 
counterpart, import less products from other partners (trade diversion). Measuring the size of 
trade creation versus diversion would be necessary to understand the net impact on welfare of the 
African importing countries.  
We estimate the size of these creation and diversion effects in a standard gravity model, in which 
imports of African countries are explained by GDP and GDP per capita of the importer and of its 
partner, as well as by geographical and historical variables such as distance, common borders, 
common languages, and former colonial ties. We also include dummy variables for bilateral 
relations with China and with non-China partners. Each of these dummy variables is made time 
specific, so that trade creation and diversion effects can be observed in the pattern of the 
parameters of such variables over time. 
This estimation is performed on all imports flows reported by African countries in the UN 
COMTRADE database, with all possible partners. We report here estimates using the fixed 
effects method, which collapses the effect of all the geographical and historical bilateral 
dummies in the fixed effect parameters (Table 4). Estimates for the parameters associated to 
GDP and GDP per capita have reasonable values (both GDP and population have a positive 
influence on trade flows). We find that the parameters associated with the dummy variables for 
bilateral relations with China increase over time, suggesting a clear trade creation effect over the 
period 1996-2007. On the other hand, the parameters associated with bilateral relations with non-
China partners have no significant trend. We conclude from these estimates that there is no 
significant trade diversion effect.  
Part of the explanation of the increase of imports from China could be due to imports of parts of 
products newly exported to the United States under the AGOA scheme, which provides generous 
rules of origin treatment in the apparel industry. In order to check that this AGOA effect does not 
explain the aggregate patterns that we observe, we have re-estimated our equations with a sub-  22
sample excluding African countries that have exported significant quantities of apparels with 
high content on non-AGOA/non-US textiles to the United States under the AGOA scheme. 
These countries are Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Swaziland. Results reported in Table 4 do 
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Table 4: Estimation of trade creation and diversion effects using a gravity model 
 All  African  reporters 
Sample excluding countries importing textile 
to export apparels under AGOA  












GDP reporter  1.07  ***          0.88  ***        
 (4.14)            (3.38)           
GDP partner  0.62  ***          0.41  **         
 (3.32)            (2.18)           
GDP per cap.  -0.50  *          -0.30           
reporter (1.94)            (1.13)         
GDP per cap.  -0.51  ***          -0.30           
partner (2.74)           (1.61)           
intercept -25.64  ***          -19.36 ***       
   (5.01)                 (3.74)                
year 1996      -0.14    -0.12  ***      -0.13    -0.12  *** 
     (0.36)    (3.02)        (0.33)    (2.90)  
year 1997      -0.11    0.01        -0.11    0.02   
     (0.29)    (0.29)        (0.27)    (0.53)  
year 1998      0.00    -0.01        0.02    0.01   
     (0.01)    (0.13)        (0.04)    (0.20)  
year 1999      0.12    -0.13  ***      0.15    -0.11  *** 
     (0.32)  *** (2.72)        (0.38)  ***  (2.32)  
year 2000      0.24    -0.19  ***      0.25    0.17  *** 
     (0.65)    (3.66)        (0.65)    -  
year 2001      0.30    -0.20  ***      0.37    -0.16  *** 
     (0.82)    (3.55)        (0.98)    -  
year 2002      0.35    -0.08        0.37    -0.04   
     (0.95)    (1.37)        (0.96)    -  
year 2003      0.60    -0.03        0.60    0.00   
     (1.62)    (0.46)        (1.56)    (0.00)  
year 2004      0.79  **  -0.02        0.79  **  0.01   
     (2.12)    (0.24)        (2.04)    (0.14)  
year 2005      1.11  *** 0.01        1.13  ***  0.04   
     (2.91)    (0.07)        (2.87)    (0.48)  
year 2006      1.39  *** 0.08        1.41  ***  0.10   
     (3.53)    (0.86)        (3.48)    (1.12)  
year 2007      1.39  *** 0.10        1.52  ***  0.15   
         (3.21)     (1.03)           (3.42)     (1.55)   
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level, Student-t statistics within brackets. Method of 
estimation: within countries. All variable in logs except the dummy variables. 
On the export side, China offers significant preferential tariff treatment to a number of African 
countries. In recent years, it has significantly expanded the list of products that it imports duty-  24
free from eligible African countries. This list covers now more than 250 products, and it has been 
announced that the list will be expanded to more than 440 items, possibly by the end of 2009 
(Minson 2008). Current preferences are equivalent on average to a 10% tariff preference, which 
is quite significant. Minson has estimated the overall economic value of such preferences as $10 
million per year.  
Products for which China grants tariff exemption are principally raw materials, while 
transformed products face higher tariffs. This is not favourable to diversification of African 
exports. However, China grants also tariff exemption for some semi-finished or finished products 
that several African countries are able to export, such as products made of plastic, leather 
products, and textile and apparel products.  
Comparing the AGOA and EBA trade preferential regimes, Collier and Venables (2007b) have 
found that rules of origin are a major determinant of the impact of trade preferences on 
diversification: the AGOA has a positive impact in some countries due to its loose rules of origin 
in the apparel industry, contrary to the EBA scheme. Given that the rules of origin imposed by 
China are also relatively generous, with a minimum of 40% value added in the exporting 
countries, these tariff exemptions can have a positive effect on African industrialization, insofar 
as it would help some African countries to develop export diversification based on 
decomposition of the value chain. This effect would be possibly lower than the effect of the 
AGOA rule of origin system in the apparel industry, but probably more significant than that of 
the EBA provision of the European Union. 
Up to now, African countries have been little involved in global networks of manufacturing 
based on decomposition of the value chain, except in the apparel industry thanks to the AGOA. 
But the Chinese industrial companies have a long experience of this. The success of African 
countries in creating such production networks with Chinese partners will however be 
conditioned by their capacity to be competitive in particular segments of production. As the 
experience of the AGOA shows, only a few African countries are currently able to reach this 
stage.  
4.3. Synthesis on Chinese Engagement in Africa and Diversification 
There is little evidence that Chinese engagement in Africa is adverse to economic diversification 
there. The most serious argument, about the Dutch disease, is about the influence of China on   25
world markets rather than specifically about engagement of China in Africa. Nevertheless, it is 
worth testing this hypothesis. Through its investment, its aid policy and its trade policy, China’s 
engagement in Africa is becoming large, and could have an impact on economic diversification 
in countries where China is particularly engaged. For example, the sectoral orientation of 
Chinese FDI could be more (or less) oriented towards natural resource extraction than that of 
non-Chinese firms. African partner countries receiving assistance from China may also have 
policies more favourable to the extraction of natural resources (or not). In order to test these 
ideas, we start by building a standard diversification equation, based on ideas developed notably 
by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and UNECA (2007). 
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) have shown that economic diversification of a country can be related 
to its economic development, measured by GDP per capita, through an inverted-U shaped curve. 
Diversification is also positively related to the size of the country, measured by its population 
size.  Diversification can be influenced also by policies. We introduce two policy variables: the 
first, the time required to register a new business, provides information on the costs of starting a 
business; the second is the existence in the country of an export processing zone (EPZ). The 
objective of creation of EPZ is mainly to diversify the economy, through fiscal and regulatory 
exemptions granted to companies that export manufactured goods. In previous literature, the 
success of EPZs in helping diversification has been debated. Nevertheless, there are examples of 
EPZ successes (the EPZ schemes of Mauritius and more recently Madagascar). Finally, we 
introduce a dummy variable for oil rich countries, to take account of the possibility of a severe 
Dutch disease effect in such countries. 
Our dependent variable is the inverse of a Herfindhal index computed on exports disaggregated 
at the HS 6 digit level. We use all data reported by African countries in the UN COMTRADE 
database. We report here regressions computed using a between estimator, as the period covered 
(2003 to 2007) is not long enough for a time-series analysis. Our benchmark equation is reported 
in the first column of Table 5 (all variables are in logarithms, except the oil dummy).    26
 
 
Table 5: Determinants of diversification  
   Equation 1    Equation 2    Equation 3    
GDP  per  capita  0.45 *** 0.47 *** 0.43 *** 
  (2.99)   (6.40)   (2.97)  
population  0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.38 *** 
  (3.73)   (6.19)   (4.03)  
time to start a 
business  -0.60 *** -0.57 *** -0.14 * 
  (2.71)   (5.67)   (1.74)  
EPZ  dummy  0.62 **  0.66 *** 0.58 ** 
  (2.37)   (5.13)   (2.21)  
oil rich country 
dummy  -2.47 *** -2.58 *** -2.45 *** 
  (6.07)   (10.31)  (5.97)   
intercept  -5.31 **  -5.58 *** -7.09 *** 
   (2.05)     (3.91)     (3.08)    
estimation method  Between     OLS     Random effect 
R2  0.657   0.610   0.570  
number of 
observations  35     130     130    
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level. Student-t statistics within brackets. All variable in 
logs except the dummy variables. 
Attempts at estimating an inverted-U relation with GDP per capita failed. Given that all African 
countries are below the threshold point above which diversification declines with GDP per 
capita, as estimated by Imbs and Wacziarg (about US$ 16 000, converted in 2007 PPP terms), 
this result is not surprising. Hence we introduce here the GDP per capita in linear form, instead 
of the usual quadratic form. All parameters are highly significant, and this regression explains a 
large part of the between variance of the dependent variable. In order to check the robustness of 
this estimation, we have also performed OLS and random effect estimations, with very similar 
results (equations 2 and 3).  
In Table 6 we use this benchmark equation to test the impact of diversification of variables 
measuring engagement with China (the share of exports to China in total exports, the share of 
imports from China in total imports, the share of the stock of FDI from China in total FDI 
received, and the ratio of turnover of economic cooperation with China over GDP). It is clear   27
from these results that China engagement in African countries has had so far no significant 
influence, whether negative or positive, on economic diversification. We find the same results 
whatever the estimation method (between, OLS or random effect – results not reported).  
 
Table 6: Test of the impact of China’s engagement on export diversification  
   Equation 1     Equation 2     Equation 3     Equation 4    
GDP per capita  0.46  *** 0.47 **  0.40 **  0.49 ***
  (2.93)    (2.94)   (2.40)   (3.03)  
population  0.36  *** 0.35 *** 0.37 ***  0.33 ***
  (3.33)    (3.30)   (3.50)   (3.18)  
time to start a business  -0.61  **  -0.58 **  -0.61 **  -0.60 ** 
  (2.66)    (2.41)   (2.51)   (2.69)  
EPZ dummy  0.59  **  0.56 *  0.66 **  0.64 ** 
  (2.11)    (1.92)   (2.27)   (2.40)  
oil rich country dummy  -2.50  *** -2.53 *** -2.41 ***  -2.36 ***
  (5.90)    (5.87)   (5.44)   (5.42)  
share of exports to China  0.01            
  (0.25)            
share of imports from China     0.10         
     (0.44)         
share of FDI        -0.03      
from China        (0.39)      
turnover of economic            -0.06   
coop. with China/GDP            (0.72)   
intercept  -5.27  *  -5.13 *  -5.20 *  -5.98 ** 
   (1.88)     (1.84)     (1.81)     (2.15)   
estimation method  Between     Between     Between     Between    
R2  0.66    0.662   0.688   0.663  
number of observations  35     35     32     35    
Note: *** (resp **, *) significant at 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level. Student-t statistics within brackets. 
Method of estimation: within countries. All variable in logs except the dummy variables.   28
 
4.4. Special Economic Zones and Diversification 
While China appears to have had no significant impact on African diversification so far, China’s 
support for the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Africa could change this. Special 
Economic Zones have similarities with economic processing zones, insofar as their aim is to 
stimulate the agglomeration of new economic activities in a given area by providing 
infrastructure and other facilities.
10 In both cases, it is expected that this agglomeration will 
create positive externalities among businesses that will promote a sustainable diversification 
process. China has a long and fruitful experience at home with SEZs, which have formed the 
backbone of its industrial development in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the development impact of 
such projects is uncertain, given the enclave nature of SEZs and potential limitations such as lack 
of infrastructure and institutional governance issues. 
The information on SEZ projects is scattered and sometimes inconsistent. According to Davies et 
al. (2008), the Chinese government has announced in the context of the FOCAC the development 
of 3 to 5 SEZs in Africa, in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt and Tanzania. In January 2009, 
the Chinese Minister for Commerce Chen Deminz confirmed that five SEZs have been initiated 
as follows: the Zambia–China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the Guangdong 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone and the Lekki Duty Free Trade Zone in Lagos, Nigeria, 
the Egypt-Suez Economic and Trade Zone and the Ethiopian Orient Industrial Park. In April 
2009, Chinese press indicated that China was building 7 economic and trade cooperation zones.
11  
Table 7 below summarizes information available on several SEZs.  Time will be required to see 
if these zones make a significant contribution to diversification in Africa.   
                                                 
10 We prefer however keeping the term SEZ for these Chinese projects in Africa, instead of using the term EPZ, 
given that the building of an EPZ is a domestic policy, and may entail specific measures such as tax exemptions.  
11 Source Xinhua News Agency, April 19, 2009.   29
 
Table 7: Chinese SEZs in Africa 
Country Name  Planned  investment 
(US$ million) 
Principal sectors 
Planned in FOCAC      
Zambia ZCCZ  800  Copper  products 
Nigeria Lekki  FTZ  200   
 Ogun  State  FTZ     
Egypt  Suez SETZ  800  textile, petroleum, automotive 
and electrical appliance 
Ethiopia  Dukem Industrial Park  713  textile, leather and construction 
equipment 
Others      
Mauritius Tianli  ETCZ  625   
Algeria  Mostaganem ETZ  550  automotive industry, 
construction materials, 





Source: various press reports 
5.   Conclusion  
  This paper has considered the consequences of China’s engagement in Africa for African 
economic development. Due to a lack of good information, we have attempted to analyze this 
engagement using indirect methods. Given the fact that Chinese assistance to Africa is 
essentially tied, we interpreted the fast growing imports from China and turnover of economic 
cooperation with China as relevant signals of this engagement. By doing so, we cannot 
disentangle the effect of true aid flows (in the sense of DAC definitions) from the effect of other 
financial flows, but in any case no data source provides accurate data on aid flows compatible 
with the DAC definition.  
The usual suspicion is that China provides assistance to a few natural resource rich countries and 
does not pay attention to criteria advocated by the DAC donor community, notably good 
governance.   
Our findings suggest that the core of the Chinese financial engagement in Africa is either in 
countries with which it has good political relations, notably its “all weather friends” such as 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania, or in countries that represent strategic interests for the 
Chinese economy due to their oil and mineral resources, such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, the   30
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia. Thus China, like other bilateral 
donors, does pursue its own economic interests in its engagement with Africa. However, in 
recent years China’s engagement with Africa has expanded to cover most countries in the 
continent and beyond natural resources to light manufacturing and services. Clear examples are 
China’s projects in Mauritius and Botswana. China is also significantly involved in some 
countries that are “aid darlings” of the international donor community, such as Ghana.  
Moreover, China’s development assistance policy has had from its very beginning an orientation 
towards poverty reduction, with significant cooperation and technical assistance in the health 
sector and agriculture. In recent years, we observe also, insofar as data permit, some influence of 
poverty on Chinese geographical aid allocation. Recently, China’s financial engagement in 
Africa has supported sectors that are under-financed by the international donor community, 
notably infrastructure. This is an area in which there is room for cooperation between China and 
multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, 
although so far such cooperation has been limited. It should also be noted that Chinese financing, 
including loans, has not had an adverse effect on the reduction of African over-indebtedness 
under the HIPC initiative, although a risk of excessive debt still exists in some countries. 
Mitigating this risk is another important reason for increased cooperation between China and 
multilateral financial institutions. On balance, China’s engagement in Africa can be beneficial 
both to China and to African countries.  
This engagement can be helpful in assisting African economies through the current global 
financial crisis. Since the end of 2008, Chinese leaders have repeated that the crisis will not 
affect their assistance to Africa. Keeping this commitment would help Africa mitigate the 
adverse consequences of the global financial crisis, and will be a good test of China’s desire to 
maintain its support for African development.  
Engagement with Africa can also help support China’s growth through the current economic 
environment. As China’s financial sector is insulated from international financial markets, the 
main impact of the financial crisis on China has come through reduced demand for its exports  
(for example, China’s exports fell by 25.7% in February 2009 below the February 2008 level). 
While Africa receives only a small share of China’s exports, nevertheless continued growth in 
Africa will contribute to the recovery of China’s exports.  And lending to resource-rich African   31
countries in RMB may not turn out to be a poor investment, particularly if the RMB continues its 
appreciation against the dollar.  
Finally, the global financial crisis gives China an opportunity to consolidate its role in Africa as a 
major partner, and hence strengthen its diplomatic ties with a continent that will become in future 
decades an increasingly significant player in the global economy due to its demographic trends 
and its natural resource endowment. Continued assistance to Africa will serve China’s long term 
strategic and political interests.   
There is some anecdotal evidence of a recent slowdown of China engagement in some African 
countries, such as Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo, perhaps reflecting the plunge 
of prices of commodities in global markets. But China’s disengagement may also signal China’s 
unwillingness to continue pouring billions of dollars into countries with extreme levels of 
political instability and government mismanagement.  Steps by China to be more selective in 
choosing the partner countries where it increases its engagement may be bad news for the 
governments of countries where it adopts a more cautious attitude, but may be good news for the 
development of the African continent as a whole.   
China’s trade and investment flows to Africa have increased exponentially. These flows still may 
be described as exports of African raw materials to China and imports of Chinese manufactured 
goods by Africa, reinforced by significant FDI flows from China into Africa’s natural resource 
industries. This pattern is not different from the pattern of Africa’s trade and investment relations 
with developed market economies, and simply corresponds to Africa’s comparative advantages. 
The assumption that there would be a specific “Dutch disease” effect attributable only to 
increased trade with China does not make much sense, given the similarity of Chinese and non-
Chinese imports of African commodities.  
Two more interesting questions are (1) whether trade with China leads to a trade diversion effect 
and (2) whether the growing trade and investment relations between Africa and China will help 
or hinder the necessary diversification of African economies from a purely resource based 
structure.  Our answer to the first question is definitely negative. The impressive growth of 
imports of Chinese products in Africa corresponds to a trade creation rather than a trade 
diversion effect. This trade creation may be related to growing financial assistance given by 
China to Africa, which can be interpreted as the equivalent of an export subsidy. The absence of   32
a trade diversion effect supports the conclusion that such new trade flows are welfare improving 
for African countries. 
As to the second question, China’s engagement in Africa, however defined, has not had any 
impact on African economic diversification. However, China could help some African countries 
diversify their economies in the future. First, the numerous SEZ projects that have been initiated 
in the past few years in several African countries will promote diversification, if they succeed. 
Some of them may fail, as in other regions, because countries with poor governance and 
infrastructure are not good candidates for successful development of SEZs. Second, China has 
reduced tariffs on manufactured exports from some of its trading partners, with relatively flexible 
rules of origin. Such preferences may help at least a few African countries where there is some 
potential for developing manufacturing production integrate into the global decomposition of the 
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